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Social Progress

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

Berlin Crisis

OCTOBER 1961

Social Progress

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BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION

IN THIS issue of SOCIAL PROGRESS we discuss at some length the critical question of the status and future of Berlin—the background of the crisis, the meaning of some of the recent developments, the problem of the refugees from East Germany, the points of difference between Western and Soviet views, the possibility of a "third way" in resolving the conflict.

The Berlin crisis has been featured in the news continuously for many weeks. Most people seem to have a fair notion of what it is all about.

Their reactions, however, are quite mixed. A great many are interested but complacent, not really concerned, and unable to see in the Berlin problem a danger and a challenge. Others are extreme and irrational in what they say about the inevitability of war over Berlin.

Let there be no question about the seriousness of the Berlin question. The crisis is real and grave. It is undoubtedly true that the threat of world conflict is greater now than at any time since 1945. Some are saying that the next ninety days will be a period of extreme peril for our civilization and, indeed, for the human race. We can ill afford not to recognize and to take full account of the gravity of the crisis over Berlin.

This does not mean, however, that we have to surrender to fear or gloom. The danger is great—this we recognize. But we do not conclude that war is imminent or inevitable. Other forces are at work in the world than those operating now in the controversy over Berlin.

The problem, of course, is not only Berlin. The question of the status and future of Berlin is one aspect of the larger question of

Germany. The declared goal of the Western powers since the end of the war has been the reunification of Germany. The present reality is a divided Germany, a condition to which the West has contributed by making West Germany a part of the alliance against the Communist powers of East Europe. There appears now to be no possibility that Germany can be reunited by any scheme acceptable to both sides, and the West's policies and declared goals must be adjusted to this fact.

It is true that there is wide unrest in East Germany. In the last ten years, one in seven of East Germany's population has "voted with his feet" against the Communist regime. Life is hard for many East Germans, and they see little hope for improvement. Stories are told of the failure of the sovietized farms to meet production goals, and serious slowdowns in many East German industries because of the flight of workers to the West. There are rumors that the East German regime is resorting to forms of forced labor to keep essential industries operating at capacity.

All this does not mean, however, that East Germany is about to collapse or that the Communist regime is in danger of succumbing to internal weakness or revolt. It would be a great mistake to count on anything like that taking place. The Communist rulers of East Germany, with Soviet backing, are capable, we believe, of maintaining their control against any visible internal threat. And as for their economy, let us remember that East Germany has achieved its own miracle of recovery and now ranks sixth in industrial capacity among the nations of the world.

The Berlin crisis should be seen in the context of the larger problem of the two German republics. Our purpose in giving so much space to the controversy over Berlin is to help our readers to assess the issues intelligently and to respond to them rationally and sensitively.

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The death of Dag Hammarskjöld has cast a deep shadow across the opening of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the organization he served so brilliantly as Secretary-General.

The world has been shocked and saddened by his abrupt and violent removal from the international scene. He will be greatly missed. His death comes at a time when he is most needed. In the loss of Dag Hammarskjöld, the troubled cause of peace and order suffers a setback.

Mr. Hammarskjöld came to his post as head of the UN Secretariat and its only elected officer from an important but relatively obscure government ministry in his native Sweden. In the eight years of his UN service, he brought unprecedented (and, for some, unintended) prestige and power to the office of Secretary-General. Many UN delegates have expressed amazement at Mr. Hammarskjöld's skill as a diplomat and his growing influence in world affairs. His very success exposed him a year ago, and ever since then, to Soviet scorn and attack.

The great strength of the man was his unfailing integrity and cold impartiality. He acted precisely and faithfully in accord with resolutions of the UN Security Council in dealing with crises in the Middle East in 1956 and 1958, and in the Congo in 1960 and 1961. If in one situation his influence was cast against the interests of certain Western powers, in another he brought confusion to the designs of the Soviet Union, and in either case he was guided only and entirely by UN decisions.

Mr. Hammarskjöld stated his conception of the United Nations as an agent of co-operation among autonomous bodies (sovereign nations), and of the role of the Secretary-General, in a notable address at the University of Chicago in May, 1960. The address was published in SOCIAL PROGRESS last November. The concluding paragraph suggests the philosophy that sustained and guided him:

Perhaps a future generation, which knows the outcome of our present efforts, will look at them with some irony. They will see where we fumbled, and they will find it difficult to understand why we did not see the direction more clearly and work more consistently toward the target it indicates. So it will always be, but let us hope that they will not find any reason to criticize us because of a lack of that combination of steadfastness of purpose and flexibility of approach which alone can guarantee that the possibilities which we are exploring will have been tested to the full. Working at the edge of the development of human society is to work on the brink of the unknown. Much of what is done will one day prove to have been of little avail. That is no excuse for the failure to act in accordance with our best understanding in recognition of its limits but with faith in the ultimate result of the creative evolution in which it is our privilege to co-operate.

●

The story of Kirchentag (pages 13–17) adds to the splendid accounts in the September 1 and September 15 issues of *Presbyterian Life.*

It was really very fortunate that Kirchentag was held in Berlin—so soon before the apparently irrevocable closing of the border between the Eastern and Western sectors of the divided city. This may have been the last opportunity in many years for Christians of the East zone and Christians of the West to meet together for fellowship and witness in a great church assembly.

The Eichmann trial in Jerusalem made a deep impression upon the thinking people of Germany. This was evidenced by the attention given in the Kirchentag to the question of Jewish-Christian relations. The statement issued by the Kirchentag work group discussing this subject (page 15) is worth careful reading.

The question of Germany and Berlin was not on the proposed agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations as it began its work in New York on September 19, or at the time of this writing, but we predict, that it will be there before long.

The Berlin Crisis

BERLIN in July was a place of relative calm and quiet, as the center of a storm should be.

Even in the crowded reception center and temporary camps for refugees in the Western sector of the divided city there was no appearance of alarm or crisis. The great debate over Berlin and its future was taking place not there but in Moscow, Paris, London, and Washington.

Then in August came the closing of the border between the two sectors of the city. The rulers of East Berlin erected a barricade of concrete and barbed wire against their own people. The rush of refugees was effectively stopped. The city's somber serenity gave way to tension and apprehension. There were demonstrations and even some violence along the guarded border. It was still true, however, that decisions affecting Berlin's status and future were being made not in the city itself but in the Soviet Union and in the capitals of the Western powers.

In September the debate moved for a time to Belgrade, where representatives of twenty-four nonaligned nations were caucusing, and to the halls of the United Nations meeting in New York. The West German elections on September 17, when West Berlin's Mayor Willy Brandt was Konrad Adenauer's principal opponent for the chancellorship, were watched with great interest, but the outcome had little direct bearing on the Berlin crisis.

And now, in October, the debate continues in the world's capitals and in the General Assembly and committees of the United Nations. The danger is still very great, but there appears to be a growing possibility of some kind of suitable settlement of the central issues of the Berlin problem through negotiation. In the meantime, the West is waiting to hear what the International Communist Congress, meeting this month, will say about Berlin.

FACTS ABOUT BERLIN

The divided city of Berlin lies in East Germany—110 miles from the border between the German Federal Republic (West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

West Berlin, consisting of the American, French, and British sectors, has an area of 185.7 square miles, and a population of about 2.2 million persons, of whom 73 per cent are Protestant and 11 per cent Roman Catholic.

East Berlin, consisting of the Soviet sector, has an area of 155.6 square miles and a population of just over a million persons—71 per cent Protestant and 10 per cent Roman Catholic.

Before the war, Berlin, then Germany's capital and greatest city, had a population of 4.5 million. Now the total population of the divided city is approximately 3.3 million.

The total area of Berlin (341.3 square miles) is three and a half times that of Washington, D.C., and two and a half times the area of Philadelphia.

The border separating West Berlin from the Eastern sector is 28.2 miles in length. The zonal border, separating West Berlin from East Germany (excepting East Berlin), is 69.1 miles long.

In West Berlin the legal currency is the West German mark (DM.). The valid monetary unit in East Berlin is the East German mark (ODM.). At recent exchange rates, the West German mark is worth about 4.7 East German marks. In East Berlin, however, the legal exchange is at the rate of one to one, an arrangement designed to make it impossible, or at best very difficult, for West Berliners to take advantage of the favorable exchange rate by buying cheap East German marks and doing their bargain shopping in the Eastern sector. Shops in East Berlin require customers from across the border to show proof that their money was purchased at the "legal" rate.

The division of the city into two sectors, West and East, in 1948 means that there are two city administrations, two telephone systems, separate gas, water, and electric power systems, two civilian airports (Tempelhof for the West and Schönefeld for the East), two transportation companies (bus and streetcar).



The separation of the telephone system means that ordinary calls between the two sectors are routed through Frankfurt and Leipzig over a thousand miles of cable.

Three important municipal services, however, continue (at the time of this writing) to be city-wide. These are: (1) the sewer system, which is operated by the East with the help of an annual cost-of-maintenance contribution from the West; (2) the elevated railway (*S-bahn*),

which is owned and operated by the East Berlin government; and (3) the subway (*U-bahn*), which is run by the West, although a large number of cars are owned by the East. (West Berlin officials told the writer in July that in case of the closing of the border and the sealing off of East Berlin, the city-wide services now linking the two sectors could be divided and run as separate systems with relative ease.)

Prior to the closing of the East-West border in Berlin in August, it was normally possible for citizens to cross from East to West and from West to East via the *U-bahn* or *S-bahn* with no interruption or difficulty. Indeed, the number of East Berliners who worked in the Western sector and who crossed the border at least twice each working day was known to be at least 53,000 and may have been as many as 80,000. Conversely, some 7,000 lived in the West and worked in the East. This was before the sealing of the border in early August.

In normal times, before the border closing, a great many persons crossed from East to West and from West to East for reasons other than employment. Thousands of West Berliners every week attended theater or opera in East Berlin (which are of very high quality), traveling by subway or taxi or private car. Likewise, thousands of East Berliners every week crossed the line to window shop, to see the sights, to admire the brash modern architecture of the new churches and of the new apartment houses in the Hansa section of West Berlin, to stroll through the plush Hilton Hotel, or to use the reading rooms of the America House. (In the period before the closing of the border, nearly 40 per cent of the 3,000 persons who daily visited America House were from East Berlin. This has been the largest and busiest American information center in the world.)

Before the border closing, there were 80 crossing points between East and West Berlin, including certain subway and elevated railway stations. The principal surface crossing points were at the Brandenburg Gate and the Potsdamer Platz. The examination of credentials by East Berlin military police in normal times was usually quite perfunctory.

Of West Berlin's 2.2 million inhabitants, 60 per cent are over 40 years of age, 40 per cent over 50, 20 per cent over 60, 12 per cent over 70. The average age is 42, as compared with 24 for West Germany. The transient and temporary population, however, including the rising numbers of refugees during June and July and early August of this year, is made up of a large proportion of young people. An estimated 60 per cent of the refugees in this period were under 25 years of age.

West Berlin's population includes a high proportion of women. For every 1,000 men, there are more than 1,200 women living in the Western sector of Berlin.

West Berlin has enjoyed steady industrial growth. Its industrial product accounts for about 4 per cent of the output of West Germany as a whole. It is still true, however, that West Berlin's economic development is quite heavily subsi-

dized—at present by such means as generous tax exemptions and other concessions. The economy is hardly viable at present levels of production and standards of living. For a time, West Berlin was heralded as a "showcase of the West" in the heart of Communist Germany. As such it presents a slightly false front in regard to economic achievement. In the meanwhile, the Communists have been building up East Berlin so that the outward differences between the two sectors are not as startling as they were a few years ago.

Even so, West Berlin provides more jobs than any city of either East or West Germany. Some claim that West Berlin is the leader also in industrial output. The total turnover (production plus services) in 1960 amounted to nearly $6.4 billion as compared with about $6.0 billion in 1959 and $1.8 billion in 1950. Electric and electronic goods account for 29 per cent of West Berlin's industrial product and represent 12 per cent of the goods of that category produced in West Germany. Food processing, textiles, and machinery are among the other leading West Berlin industries. The garment industry accounts for nearly half of West Germany's supply of women's clothing. The shops of West Berlin testify to the quality and diversity of its manufactures.

Education seems to be one of the principal enterprises of West Berlin. The Free University of Berlin is the city's pride, along with the large Technical University, the Academy of Arts, the Music Academy, the German Institute for Political Sciences, the Pedagogic Institute, and the Theological Seminaries. The students in these institutions of higher learning numbered close to 20,000 in 1960. Many of these students live in East Berlin, so the enrollment will very likely be reduced in the fall sessions of 1961.

West Berlin consists of 12 boroughs, each with a president and a borough council selected by the people in popular elections. The West Berlin government consists of a House of Representatives of 127 members, elected by the citizens, and a Senate of 16 members, elected by the House of Representatives. The head of the Senate is the Governing Mayor, at present the able and popular Willy Brandt.

BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS

As the residence of the Hohenzollern electors and kings from 1442 to 1918, and as the capital of the Reich from 1871 to 1945, Berlin was Germany's largest and most important city. It was the center of the country's political and economic life, of its rail, highway, and air lines, and of its system of cheap water transportation by rivers and canals.

Berlin suffered severe damage and destruction during the last months of the Second World War. Most of the center of the city, with its main government buildings, banks, and commercial houses, was completely destroyed. In the rest of the city, an estimated 80 per cent of the buildings were damaged and 20 per cent were rendered uninhabitable. The population, in spite of heavy civilian

evacuation, was over three million at the end of hostilities in Europe.

In October, 1943, a year and a half before the surrender of Germany, the foreign ministers of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union met in Moscow to consider policies and procedures to be followed after the war. A European Advisory Commission was set up to lay plans for Germany's occupation when the fighting was over.

The European Advisory Commission met in London in September, 1944, and worked out the London Protocol—a blueprint for the interim occupation of Germany by the three negotiating powers. The plan was confirmed at the Yalta Conference of heads of government (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin) in February, 1945, with the provision that France be included as a fourth occupying power. Each of the four powers was assigned a zone and was pledged "to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsible to the will of the people . . ."

The city of Berlin, lying deep within the Soviet zone, was made a unit in itself, divided into American, British, French, and Soviet sectors, under a joint military *Kommandatura.* During the occupation there was to be freedom of travel across sectoral borders within the city. Access to Berlin from the British, French, and American zones of Germany was guaranteed. These arrangements and agreements were intended to be temporary. They were intended also to be operative and binding until the goal of the occupation should be achieved—namely, free elections and the setting up of a democratic government for all of Germany.

The final conquest of Germany by British, American, Russian, and some French forces took place in the early months of 1945. The American First and Ninth Armies, driving from the west, swept through central Germany, reaching Leipzig, 85 miles from Berlin, on April 19. The advance was halted by prearranged agreement with the Russians at the Elbe River, some 50 miles west of Berlin, in late April. In the meantime, Russian forces had reached the Oder River, only 34 miles east of Berlin, on February 4. German resistance was concentrated on the eastern front. In the massive move on Berlin, the Russians used perhaps as many as two million men, and large amounts of air and surface armaments. They reached the approaches to Berlin on April 23, and two days later the city was completely surrounded. The battle of Berlin was

bitter and costly. The city's defenders capitulated on May 2. The final German surrender took place on May 7.

The Soviet military command set up, on May 17, a municipal council for Greater Berlin, with a preponderance of Communist members. The joint Allied Command, the *Kommandatura,* took over the administration of Berlin on July 11, as prescribed by the London Protocol, and Allied military rule was established in the four sectors of the city.

The Soviet sector in the center and east, largely industrial, was the largest in both area (155 square miles) and population (1.1 million). The American sector in the southwest, mostly residential, included some of the most attractive parts of the city and had a population of nearly one million persons. The British sector, with a population of about 610,000, included several lovely lakes and woods. The French sector in the northwest was the smallest, with a population of about 420,000.

The heads of the three Allied powers—Truman, Stalin, and Churchill, whose place was taken by Atlee after the British elections on July 26—met in Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin, from July 17 to August 2. The leaders pledged themselves to carry out the provisions of the Yalta Agreement. They agreed also that during the occupation, Germany was to be considered as an economic unit.

In the very period of the Potsdam Conference, however, the Communists closed private banks in the Soviet zone. This was the beginning of the sovietizing of the economy of the eastern zone. In the fall of 1945, the study of Russian was made compulsory in the schools of the Soviet sector of Berlin. Communist youth groups were organized throughout the Soviet zone in the spring of 1946. On April 21, 1946, the Communist Party of the East zone was organized, with *Neues Deutschland,* a newspaper published in the Soviet sector of Berlin, as its official organ.

A four-power foreign ministers' conference in Paris in June and July, 1946, failed to agree on the question of a peace treaty for Germany as a whole. The Western powers argued that the time had come to work out the terms of a peace treaty. The Soviet Union insisted that it was necessary first to establish an acceptable (to the Communists) German government that would undertake to meet harsh Soviet demands for reparations. Two later foreign ministers' meetings in 1947 broke up on the same issue of reparations.

On August 1, 1946, a year after the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet Union announced the erection (by *decree,* not by free elections) of an East German government for internal affairs.

October 20, 1946, is a critical date in the Berlin story. The four occupying powers sponsored free elections for the Berlin Municipal Council. The Communist rulers of the Soviet sector consented to the elections, apparently hoping to win a majority of council seats. When the votes were counted, however, the Communists had won only 26 out of a total of 130 seats (19.8 per cent of the popular vote, as compared with

48.7 per cent for the Social Democrats and 22.1 per cent for the Christian Democrats). That was the end of free elections in the Soviet sector and, indeed, in the Soviet zone of Germany.

The Municipal Council elected Ernst Reuter to the office of Governing Mayor, but the action was vetoed by the Soviet representatives in the *Kommandatura*. The Communists used every opportunity to try to control the Council or, failing in that effort, to frustrate its work. There was a growing split between the Soviet leaders and the military commands of the other three sectors.

The Berlin Municipal Council again, in July, 1947, elected Ernst Reuter as Governing Mayor, and again his election was rejected by the Russian Commandant. The disagreement was taken to the Allied Control Council (for all of Germany), where the Soviet representative sustained the ban against Reuter's appointment.

The Soviet leaders in the East zone continued to refuse to cooperate with the Western powers in such matters as the issuing of a stabilized currency for all Germany. On March 6, 1948, the three Western occupying powers invited the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg to collaborate in the formulating of new political and economic policies for West Germany. The six powers decided: (1) to set up a federal republic in West Germany and (2) to introduce a new German currency. In protest, the Soviet Union withdrew from the Allied Control Council in Germany and, on April 1, took measures to isolate Berlin, particularly the Western sector, from West Germany.

The blockade of Berlin became "total" on June 23. The Soviet representative quit the four-power *Kommandature* on July 1, leading to the division of the city's administration into East and West sectors.

The American-British airlift began to operate on July 4, 1948, to supply West Berlin with food, fuel, and other essentials cut off by the Soviet blockade. The airlift continued until May 12, 1949. About 1.6 million tons of food and other goods were flown to the blockaded city.

Elections for the Berlin Assembly were held in December, 1948. Voting was banned in East Berlin. Social Democrats won a large majority of Assembly seats. Ernst Reuter was elected Governing Mayor by the Council.

The Soviet blockade and the British-American airlift were terminated by mutual agreement on May 12, 1949. Two days later the Western powers gave full autonomy to the West Berlin Assembly, except in military and currency matters.

The Soviet Union, on October 7, 1949, announced the establishment of the German Democratic Republic (without free elections), with East Berlin as its capital. Thus the Soviet sector of Berlin became technically, though not legally, a part of the new East Germany. On the following day, the West Berlin Assembly asked for West Berlin's incorporation into the West German Federal Republic. The Western powers objected to the move as one that would invite Soviet and East

(*Continued on page 18*)

KIRCHENTAG

THERE is nothing in the world like Kirchentag, the German "church day" which on ten occasions since 1949 has brought together tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of Christians for study, discussion, worship, and witness.

West Berlin was the host city for the Tenth Kirchentag, in July of this year. Some 30,000 were full-time participants in the five days of meetings. Attendance in the working groups (*arbeitsgruppen*) rose to 44,000 on the third day, and the closing rally on Sunday afternoon filled the great Olympic Stadium to its capacity of 100,000.

The ecumenical section included 700 or 800 delegates and special visitors from 37 countries. There were 200 from Austria, 150 from Denmark, 150 from Switzerland, 130 from the United States.

It was a full week. Activities began with a round of preliminary meetings and receptions on Monday and Tuesday, July 17 and 18. Kirchentag itself got under way on Wednesday with simultaneous worship and preaching services in twenty-three West Berlin churches. Similar services were held in a number of churches in East Berlin, where participation was greatly curtailed, but more about this later.

On Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, the program followed a pattern which has become traditional in Kirchentag—great working groups (if you can call a huge meeting of 2,000 to 6,000 persons a group) featuring Bible study, speeches, and panel discussions on important aspects of Christian life and responsibility. There were seven groups dealing with the Bible, the family, political life, economic and social relations, the laity, Jews and Christians, and the world-wide church.

The great closing service in Olympic Stadium on Sunday afternoon included music by a 2,500-piece band, a number of brief addresses, greetings by delegates from distant places, a moving dramatic report of the seven work groups, and a stirring call for Christian witness and service "where you live and where you work"—a commission with serious meaning for the many men and women from the Eastern zone who managed to attend.

The mood of Kirchentag was inevitably and deeply affected by the international debate over the future of Berlin and by the refugees from East Germany streaming into the city at the rate of over one thousand a day. Berlin is a tragic city. Really it is two cities. Two thirds of its over three million people live in West Berlin—a free community deep inside Communist territory, with limited and controlled avenues of access to West Germany and the Western world. One third live in East Berlin under heavy-handed Communist domination.

Across the border between the two sectors came the refugees, mostly young people and young adults, seeking freedom and dignity and opportunity in just about that order. Subway and elevated trains seemed to be the principal escape routes. During the week of Kirchentag nearly 10,000 came. The total for July was over 40,000, the highest number for a month since the troubled days of 1953. They came to a large reception center where they were interviewed and, if accepted, were assigned to one of some twenty camps in the city. As rapidly as possible they were flown to other parts of West Germany. The Federal Government, with a tremendous assist from a variety of private agencies, handled the huge problem with skill and compassion. The story, of course, is much more than a description of procedures and a citing of statistics. The refugees from East Germany are people, and their story is a continuous human drama of fear and despair, courage and hope.

The growing Berlin crisis and especially the tragedy implied in the flood of refugees were never far from the thoughts of all who took part in Kirchentag. Speakers did not refer directly or openly to the cleavage of Germany and of the German churches into irreconcilable East and West, or to restrictions upon Christian activity in the Soviet zone. They spoke repeatedly, however, of the solidarity of the Christian community, of the duty of every Christian to seek God's will and do it in whatever circumstance he finds himself.

Not many from East Germany were able to attend Kirchentag. The plan had been to hold the meetings in Leipzig, one of East Germany's major cities and a center of Protestant strength. Communist officials black-listed certain speakers from West Germany, however, and delayed granting assurances relating to travel restrictions and freedom of discussion. The uncertainty continued so long that it became necessary to move Kirchentag to another city. Berlin was selected in the hope that East Berlin as well as West Berlin would be involved. This hope was frustrated by the refusal of East Berlin authorities to permit any of the scheduled meetings to be held in their sector.

There were some German churchmen who believed that Kirchentag should have been canceled when the plans for Leipzig collapsed. Dr. Martin Niemoller, for example, insisted that holding Kirchentag in West Berlin was a mistake, since in that location it was bound to be regarded in the East as a political meeting. It is probably true that this charge would be made no matter when or where Kirchentag, or any meeting like it, were held.

Even though the participation of East German Christians was limited and difficult, Kirchentag's inspiration and message surely were felt in every church and community in the Communist zone. The theme of Kirchentag, *Ich bin bei euch* (I am with you), was intended to be for them a word of courage and also a reminder of their unity (in Christ) with fellow Christians in West Germany and in other lands.

The most popular working group during Kirchentag was the one having to do with Jews and Christians. The Eichmann trial in Jerusalem helped to make Jewish-Christian relations (and specifically the causes and results of anti-Semitism) the most widely discussed topic of the week.

A number of the leaders and members of the working group on Jews and Christians wrote a statement which was well received by the group (some 4,000 persons) and duly "noted" by the presidium of Kirchentag. The statement, when released to the press, was perhaps closer to being a "pronouncement" than any other utterance of this or any previous Kirchentag. Here is a rough translation of the German text of the statement:

Jews and Christians are inseparably connected to one another. The negation of this fact led to the hostility of Christians against Jews, which became the principal reason for the persecution of Jews. Jesus of Nazareth is betrayed when members of the Jewish people, in the midst of whom he was born, are despised as Jews. Every form of hostility against Jews is impiety and leads to self-destruction.

The trial taking place at present in Jerusalem concerns all of us. We Evangelical Christians in Germany are realizing that, by our guilt, we are involved in it. For the sake of rethinking and return, we ask the German public to take care of the realization of the following points:

1. Parents and educators should break their silence to the young generation, avow their own faults, and reveal the origins of the crimes so that we may learn together how to master the actual problems of our life. In view of the present political situation in the world, the effort to shift away from one's shoulders one's own faults does not mean a danger only for a certain group of men, but for all life.

2. The inhumanity of political systems' ordering crimes and the reference to the so-called "Befehlsnotstand" (compulsion to obey and carry through orders against one's better judgment) have to warn us against the inhuman possibilities of modern organizations of society and state. We must be prepared to take over our own political responsibility, even in case of personal threat. Persons having participated in the preparation and execution of persecutions should withdraw if they are working in leading functions.

3. Wherever Jews are living among us, we are obliged to promote their life and well-being to the best of our ability. Moreover, we Germans must do all that serves the building up and the peace of the state of Israel and its Arabian neighbors. We wish that the indemnification of those who formerly were persecuted for racial reasons will be handled in a generous manner and, particularly, accelerated. A new political and human conception must go hand in hand with this indemnification. In Germany, the so-called Jewish question is today above all a question concerning the future of the Germans.

4. In contrast to the wrong assertion promulgated by the church during past centuries that God had repudiated his chosen people, we remember anew the words of the apostle Paul: "God hath not cast away his

people which he foreknew" (Rom. 11: 2). A new meeting with the people chosen by God will confirm or resuscitate the judgment that both Jews and Christians live out of the faith of God, that they praise him and serve him in the light of Biblical hope everywhere among men.

A great many people were involved in the planning and carrying out of the Kirchentag in West Berlin. More than 500 persons worked on preparatory committees and handled important functions such as reception and registration, housing, transportation, arrangements for meetings of all sizes and forms, and directing the working groups. Some 32,000 substantial lunches were prepared and served in special facilities set up for Kirchentag. More than 1,200 young people from Berlin parishes served as guides. Skilled interpreters were recruited and assigned to ecumenical visitors.

In all the years of the Kirchentag movement, among all the people who have been involved one name stands out—Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff, the dedicated layman who started it all and who has served as president since the beginning, in 1949. It is reported that he plans to retire from the presidency this year.

The record of attendance is imposing. (See chart below.)

The recent Kirchentag in West Berlin, though by no means the largest of the ten, is having a wide and profound effect in the churches of Germany, an effect undoubtedly enhanced by the setting in which it was held.

It is clear to many, however, that the time has come, after ten great meetings, to reconsider the purpose, form, and content of Kirchentag, and perhaps to make some changes. Among the suggestions under discussion are the following:

1. Kirchentag began as a distinctly lay-directed movement. It was not anticlerical—indeed, its success in the early years and now depends greatly upon the enthusiastic support

Place	*Full-time participants*	*Attendance in closing session*
Hannover, 1949	—	9,000
Essen, 1950	25,370	180,000
Berlin, 1951	91,600	270,000
Stuttgart, 1952	30,750	200,000
Hamburg, 1953	40,900	250,000
Leipzig, 1954	60,450	650,000
Frankfurt, 1956	61,700	500,000
Munich, 1959	40,000	360,000
Berlin, 1961	34,000	100,000

(In 1958, regional versions of Kirchentag were held in several cities.)

of the clergy in all parts of Germany. It is perhaps true that the quick and fantastic success of Kirchentag has been a surprise to most of the bishops and other clerical leaders of the German churches. In recent years there appears to have been a tendency on the part of the clergy to dominate the planning and the leadership of Kirchentag. One would hope that the "clericalization" of the movement would cease and that Kirchentag would continue to be, as it began, a truly lay movement.

2. Kirchentag seems to be missing a great opportunity in failing to give more attention to the training of lay leaders. The impact of Kirchentag on the German churches would be much deeper and more lasting if some of the tens of thousands who attend on a full-time basis were involved in a real experience of leadership training related to their roles both in the church and in the community.

3. It has been seriously proposed that at least half of Kirchentag should be addressed to the questions of Christian responsibility in daily work. Let doctors, lawyers, farmers, housewives, nurses, teachers, clerks, business executives, politicians, laborers, engineers, union officials, men and women in other callings, discuss the ethical problems and responsibilities they face in their occupations. This would make the meetings much more meaningful for many who attend.

4. Kirchentag is so large that those who attend have now no opportunity to discuss, in small groups, the lively topics that are ably presented in the working groups. At present "discussion" is pretty much limited to platform speeches and panel presentations. To divide the 40,000 who attend the working sessions into small groups of 20 or 30, where real exchange and encounter can take place, would be difficult, but it certainly is not beyond the ability of the Kirchentag leaders, who exemplify German efficiency and ingenuity, to accomplish.

5. Perhaps more could be made of the international character of Kirchentag. At Dortmund in 1963, for example, the Christian laity of France and Switzerland could be invited to participate—not only by attending but also by sponsoring, planning, and promoting the meetings (or some of them). Both German and French languages could be used in the sessions, with appropriate interpretation. This reporter, an American, would like to see Kirchentag become a truly international event.

Our ability to appraise world events requires today a knowledge of the political philosophy and goals of the Soviet Union. One of the most important Soviet statements of recent years was Mr. Khrushchev's speech of January 6, 1961, to Soviet party officials in Moscow. The speech incorporated his report of the November (1960) conference of world Communist leaders. An excellent summary and interpretive analysis of the Khrushchev speech has been prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress and is available from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We suggest you write your Senator for a copy. Ask for Senate Document 14—87th Congress (1st Session)—dated February 27, 1961. —*The Staff*

(Continued from page 12)

German retaliation. In May, 1952, however, the Allied *Kommandatura* made West Berlin a separate political entity—in effect, an unincorporated state of West Germany. In the meantime, the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and the United States issued a statement that their countries would "treat any attack against the Federal Republic of Germany or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves."

In 1953 there was evidence of some alarm in the Soviet Union over mounting discontent among the people of East Germany. On May 24, two months or so after Stalin's death, and during the brief period of Malenkov's rule, *Pravda* suggested that the Soviet Union co-ordinate its German policy with that of the Western powers in accord with the Potsdam agreements. That particular suggestion was never repeated, but a few days later the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union demanded that the Communist leaders of East Germany adopt less repressive measures in regulating the country's internal affairs, particularly its economic life.

The warning came too late. The tensions were in no small part the result of Soviet economic demands upon East Germany and of the consequently high production goals that reduced the workers to virtual serfdom. On June 17 and 18, there were mass strikes and demonstrations in East Berlin, which spread quickly to other cities throughout East Germany. This was the first large-scale revolt in a Soviet satellite country. The uprising was quickly, violently, and effectively subdued by Soviet armed force. Unforgettable were widely published pictures of East Berlin citizens throwing stones at Russian tanks.

In these years West Berlin was making dramatic progress in rebuilding the destroyed sections of the city, in industrial production, and in commercial activity. This development did not take place, however, without help from outside. The city benefited greatly by the economic recovery taking place in West Germany and by direct aid from the occupying powers. The United States, from 1949 to mid-1955, granted West Berlin $571 million (DM. 2.4 billion) in counterpart aid to stimulate the city's economy.

In the last dozen years, the East German government has tried in various ways and repeatedly to assert or to extend its control over traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. This traffic, along prescribed surface routes and air corridors, necessarily passes through or over at least 110 miles of East German territory. There have been attempts to impose embargoes, to require travel permits and special passes, to order quotas, to limit "ceilings" for the flight of aircraft, to reduce the number and size of transports.

The Western powers have refused

to deal with East German functionaries and officials except as they may act as agents for Soviet officialdom.

The Soviet Union has been trying to make the point that the Potsdam agreements are no longer binding because of the "new situation" in Berlin and in Germany. The clear intention of Communist harassment has been to force the Western powers out of West Berlin and to leave the city wholly exposed to East German control.

The Western powers refuse to abandon their occupation responsibilities in West Berlin, which include the protection of the sector's political independence and self-determination through free elections. The right to be in West Berlin and to have unmolested access to the city through and over East German territory, along with the freedom and security of West Berlin's two million citizens, is the heart of the West's "position" on the Berlin question—a position affirmed and reaffirmed in declarations, in notes, in public statements, and by Western foreign ministers and heads of government in face-to-face confrontations with their Soviet counterparts.

The present Governing Mayor of West Berlin, the popular Willy Brandt, was first elected to office in October, 1957. Shortly afterward, the West Berlin City Council elected a contingent of twenty-two nonvoting members to the West German *Bundestag*. Beginning in 1957, the West German parliament periodically has held token meetings in West Berlin to dramatize the city's tie to the Federal Republic and to remind all Germans of Berlin's former role as the capital of all Germany. The people of West Germany and West Berlin, and presumably of East Germany and East Berlin, continue to dream and hope for, though hardly to expect, the reunification of Germany as a free and democratic nation.

NEW SOVIET ULTIMATUM

The debate over Berlin came closer to a real showdown on November 27, 1958, when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev declared in notes to the Western powers that the Soviet Union intended to change the status of the divided city within six months. His proposal was that West Berlin should be cleared of allied military units and that its access routes and communications with West Germany should be placed under East German control. In March, 1959, however, Mr. Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union was extending for an unspecified time the six-month ultimatum on the status of Berlin. He also

modified his November proposal by declaring that Berlin should be a "free city" with token garrisons provided either by the Western powers or by the United Nations.

In June, 1959, Mr. Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union was prepared to sign a peace treaty with the (East) German Democratic Republic with or without the collaboration or consent of the Western powers.

The West responded to these Soviet declarations with strong restatements of policy—the right of the West to have free access to West Berlin and to maintain military garrisons in the city in line with their responsibilities under the Potsdam and Yalta agreements. The West continued its refusal to accept East German control over communications and traffic to and from West Berlin.

After his visit to the United States in the fall of 1959, it is possible that Mr. Khrushchev may have hoped that the "spirit of Camp David" would prevail at a conference of heads of government, and that he would be able, in that atmosphere, to settle the Berlin and German questions on pretty much his own terms. He persuaded his counterpart leaders of the Western powers to agree to hold a summit meeting in Paris in May, 1960.

The Paris Conference broke up before it started, ostensibly on the U-2 incident. There may have been another and perhaps primary reason for the scuttling of the Paris meeting—Mr. Khrushchev's realization that the West had no intention of letting him have his way on the Berlin and German issues.

The questions of Berlin and Germany were overshadowed by other crises in the hectic fall of 1960. Before the year was out, however, Mr. Khrushchev promised that in 1961, if the Western powers failed to join the Soviet Union in working out the terms of peace treaties with both German republics, the Soviet Union would sign a treaty of its own, and of its own making, with East Germany. The Berlin question, he declaimed, would then be settled on East German terms.

In the meantime, the Soviet Union extended by degrees the apparent sovereignty of the East German republic and its power to control the border separating East Berlin from West Berlin.

ONE IN SEVEN

A factor of great importance in the Berlin issue has been the almost continuous flow of refugees from the Eastern zone of Germany to West Germany. Berlin, with its usually easy passage between the East and West sectors of the city, has been the principal route of escape since 1952 when the East German rulers barricaded the long border between their zone and West Germany.

More than three million Germans have come from the Eastern zone to West Germany since the beginning of the occupation sixteen years ago. Most of them have come as refugees because of severe restrictions on emigration from areas under Soviet control.

At the same time, a rather large number of persons, perhaps as many as 800,000 or even more, have moved from West to East Germany. Half or more of these have been "re-

turnees"—refugees from the East who have gone back to East Germany.

There was considerable movement of people across Germany in the first few years of the occupation. This was due in part to the growing need for workers in the industrial Western zones and the more slowly paced recovery in the East.

The spreading dissatisfaction with Communist policies in the Eastern zone, culminating in the uprisings of June, 1953, produced a bulge in the rush of refugees into West Berlin. There were days (and nights) in 1953 when 2,000 or more East Germans sought refuge in West Berlin. In more "normal" periods, East German refugees appeared at West Berlin reception offices at rates ranging from a few score to several hundred a day.

The mass exodus from East Germany was somewhat abated in 1958 and 1959. In 1960, however, the number of refugees entering West Berlin rose to more than 150 thousand, a daily average of 416, while another 100 or more a day were crossing directly into West Germany.

The rush continued into 1961 at even higher rates. In the first five months of this year, 86,000 persons fled East Germany—a rate of 570 a day.

With the coming of summer the flood of refugees reached disastrous (for East Germany) proportions. The number entering West Berlin exceeded 20,000 in June, 32,000 in July (the highest monthly rate since 1953), and nearly 20,000 in the first 14 days of August.



Every refugee was voting with his feet and with his life against the East German Communist regime.

The sealing of the twenty-eight-mile long border separating East Berlin from the Western sector in the early morning hours of August 13 was sudden and decisive, but not unexpected. There had been signs that the East German regime was preparing to close the border. For many weeks, for example, barbed wire had been in short supply in the East German Republic. And the logic of the act was plain. East Germany could ill afford to allow the flight of its citizens to continue. It was bad for the reputation of communism abroad. It was worse for East Germany's economy at home, where both industry and agriculture already had suffered by the loss of technicians and manual laborers. The flight of another 100,000 workers, or young people who were potential workers, would have serious effects in key industries.

The border closing was bound to be regarded as an admission of political instability and moral failure, but even that was to be preferred over the more tangible consequence of continued mass emigration. The action was evidently dictated from outside East Germany. It came shortly after the publication of a Declaration by the (Communist) Warsaw Pact nations calling for effective controls along the East Berlin border to stop the flow of refugees from East Berlin.

The sealing of the border by the East German authorities was directed not against the West but against their own people in the East. The 80 crossing points were reduced to 13, and then, with the closing of the Brandenburg Gate, to 12. The ban on travel across the border did



not, and still does not, apply to persons, including casual visitors and sight-seers, from the West. They are usually able to enter the Eastern sector with little more difficulty than before the border was closed.

For East Germans, however, the ban on travel to the Western sector of Berlin was total and, by all appearances, permanent. Its effect was most seriously and immediately felt by the more than 50,000 East Berliners who held jobs in West Berlin. Some of these persons were later penalized and punished for having "defected" by serving in important posts in the West.

In West Berlin, the border closing caused great resentment and anxiety. The people there were deeply disappointed by the decision of the Western occupying powers to do nothing more than issue strong notes of protest and reiterate pledges that the freedom and security of the Western sector would be maintained at all costs.

Actually, there was little if anything more that the Western powers could have done about East Germany's act of sealing the border against its own people. There was no implication of threat against the independence and peace of West Berlin beyond the ever-present danger that incidents along the closed border might incite armed reprisal and explode into military action.

The disappointment in West Berlin, however, is understandable. For nine years and more the city had provided the hope and means of escape for the repressed people of East Germany. With the closing of the border and the almost complete shutting off of the flow of refugees, the people of the city could only feel that they had been deprived of one of their supreme functions, and that West Berlin had lost its very meaning in the free world.

West Berlin had indeed served the cause of freedom magnificently in the way its people responded to the refugee problem. The program was efficiently and humanely directed by a special department of the city government in co-operation with the West German government and with the assistance of several voluntary agencies.

Refugees coming into West Berlin were directed to a large Reception Center at the Marienfelde Central Camp in the southern part of the city. There was a service center for refugees in the principal elevated station, maintained by co-operating Protestant and Catholic lay organizations, to which newly arrived refugees could go for instructions. They would find, however, that almost anyone they should happen to meet in the subway or elevated stations, or on the streets, could direct them to the Marienfelde Center and help them to get there.

At the Reception Center a newcomer from East Berlin would be assigned to one of twelve reception offices where he could fill out the required forms and where the "processing" would begin. He would probably stay at Marienfelde for one night, after which he would be taken by bus to one of twenty large temporary camps in the city. There he would be given such clothing and provisions as he would need as well as sleeping quarters and meals. Daily he would be taken by bus to the Reception Center at Marienfelde where the "processing" would continue—health examination (including X-rays), sessions with West German security and immigration officers, interviews with social welfare and employment personnel. He would be required to state the real reasons, and all of them, for his flight from East Germany. This would go on for perhaps eight or ten days. At the end of the proceedings, there would be a "finding" by the examining board, after which, if he qualified, he would be given air transportation to West Germany and helped to find his place in his new homeland.

In the course of the "processing" at Marienfelde, but not as part of it, new refugees were interviewed by British, French, and American information officers as to conditions in East Germany.

It was found that more than 90 per cent of the refugees fled East Germany not because they had to but because they wanted to. A few, perhaps 5 per cent, came over the line because their political views or statements, even careless remarks, placed them in jeopardy. Some 2 or 3 per cent fled because they were wanted by the East German police as lawbreakers. These, the "criminal" group, were assigned to a special camp in West Berlin for two years, whereafter, if all was well, they were treated like other refugees and transported to West Germany.

As to the great majority who came because they wanted to, they sought (1) freedom from fear and suspicion and harassment, (2) the feeling of dignity that is the result of being treated like a person and not a number or a pawn, and (3) opportunity for education and employment according to one's own choice.

The refugees included people of all ages and all walks of life. More

COPENHAGEN
DENMARK
NORTH SEA
Rostock
Hamburg
Bremerhaven
Bremen
Elbe
SOVIET
ZONE
AMSTERDAM
NETHERLANDS
Hannover
FEDERAL
GERMAN
Rhine
Düsseldorf
REPUBLIC
Leipzig
Köln
BONN
BELGIUM
OF
Frankfurt am Main
Moselle
LUX.
Main
GERMANY
Nürnberg
Stuttgart
Donube
FRANCE
Rhine
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than 12,000 members of the People's Police in East Berlin have defected to the West since 1954. In 1960, nearly 700 medical doctors fled East Germany, along with 142 university and college lecturers and professors and over 2,000 other schoolteachers, many engineers, technicians, scientists.

In the summer of 1961, more than half of the refugees entering West Berlin were young people under twenty-five years of age. It has been noted that in summer months when schools are in recess, the number of young people leaving the East rises sharply. Many of these East German youth, perhaps restless and rebellious like youth of other lands, became refugees just for the adventure of it. But the adventure is likely to be short-lived. Being a refugee is downright tedious and exhausting (standing long hours in lines, filling out endless forms, answering interminable questions, waiting one's turn) rather than exciting. Add to this a touch of homesickness, a yearning for old friends and familiar surroundings, and possibly an urgent plea from parents to return. It is no wonder that some of the youth who came so bravely as refugees wished soon to go back to East Germany. An estimated 15 per cent of all refugees from East Germany return, and a significant proportion of these are youth.

WHO ARE THE REFUGEES?

• Near Potsdam in East Germany there is a "model" farm which last year had a herd of 1,000 cattle and a crew of five cowhands. No shelters had been provided for the cattle, however, and in the hard winter of 1960 several hundred of them died of exposure. When one of the cowhands criticized the handling of the herd and proposed new methods, he was accused by his bosses of being a bad Communist, a tool of the West. He fled before charges could be filed against him.

• A newly graduated engineer was given a good job in a large industrial plant making tanks. After a few months, he was asked by the secret police to become an "informer" in the plant, keeping tab on his fellow engineers and reporting any word or act that reflected deviant (from the Communist line) thinking. He was told that he owed this service to the state which had given him the opportunity to become an engineer. He chose, rather, to escape to West Berlin.

• A young East German couple whose baby had died from pneumonia went to East Berlin to seek the comfort of their parents who lived there and to bring them back for the funeral. In their absence, a neighborhood "informer" told the secret police that the child had died of maltreatment and that the young couple had fled. When they returned they were arrested. An investigation, including a post-mortem examination of the child, showed that the charges were false and that the baby had indeed been the victim of pneumonia. But the suspicion and persecution persisted—so the couple fled.

• A businessman came to West Berlin with his family—a wife and a seventeen-year-old daughter—and

told this story. The girl had made very good grades in elementary school, except in civics because she did not belong to the Communist youth organization. She was devoted, instead, to the youth group in her church. As a result of her low grade in civics she could not attend secondary school. The family talked about going to West Berlin, where the daughter would be able to continue her education, but the minister of their church advised them to stay as a matter of Christian duty. So they remained. The daughter found employment as a decorator's assistant. She continued to be active in the Christian youth group. The secret police one day asked her to be an "informer" for them in the youth activities of her church. She was warned not to tell her parents, but she did, and the family decided to leave in a hurry.

These are true stories and truly representative of the stories of hundreds of thousands of men and women and young people for whom life in the Communist zone became a burden and a fear.

THE BASIC ISSUES

The Berlin crisis of 1961 was precipitated by (1) Mr. Khrushchev's announcements that the Soviet Union intended to resolve the questions of the future of West Berlin and the status of East Germany regardless of what the West chose to do and (2) the rising rush of East German refugees to freedom through the "escape hatch" of West Berlin.

The historic note of November 27, 1958, with its ultimatum about Berlin, was a real bombshell. Then came the declaration of June, 1959, about a Soviet peace treaty with East Germany. These two announcements, with all their repetitions and variations in the months that followed, added a dimension of danger and



urgency to the Berlin problem which had been mostly in a state of simmer since the end of the blockade in 1949.

The refugee flood, drawing attention to West Berlin's function as a haven of freedom and hope, and at the same time revealing for all to see the unstable foundation of East German rule, could only make Mr. Khrushchev and company feel that they must act quickly and decisively.

Soviet intentions were matched by the determination of the Western powers to uphold their rights and fulfill their commitments in West Berlin. They felt that they were obligated to maintain the independence and security of the city, and to keep open the routes of access and communication with West Germany. In

all of this, they insisted that their dealings were to be with the Soviet Union and not with East Germany—until such time as a peace treaty could be negotiated between the allied powers of the Second World War, all of them, and all of Germany, and the time was not now.

Back of the Soviet moves was the East's fear of the rise of Germany as a military power. The Soviet leaders seem to believe that if a German solution were postponed, the West German Army, now under NATO command, would be provided with nuclear weapons and would then drag the Western powers into a war for the reunification of Germany. All of this is a possibility, to be sure, but a rather remote one. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union feels that the need to stabilize the existence of East Germany and thus to prevent forever the reunification of Germany is immediate and urgent.

It should be noted that France and Britain are equally concerned with Russia about the reunification of Germany. They too fear, and ordinarily would take measures to prevent, the rise of Germany as a military power. The question is whether they would ever consent to the building up of large forces in Germany, armed with atomic weapons, as a protection against the threat of a Soviet move into Western Europe.

The Soviet leaders take a dim view also of the economic and political unification of Western Europe, of the creation of a United States of Europe. Mr. Khrushchev was reportedly shocked by word in July of Great Britain's decision to join the European Common Market. He realizes that if Europe prospers on the economic front, it will undoubtedly move in the direction of political unity and become a third great world power instead of a number of relatively weak and divided nations.

It is evident that the Soviet leaders have been irritated by West Berlin's assumption of the role of unofficial capital of West Germany. They have strongly protested the occasional meetings of the West German parliament in West Berlin, especially the sessions in which parliamentary officers were elected. Mr. Khrushchev also protested the awarding of West German arms contracts to industries in West Berlin.

The Soviet goal is the "codification" of the divided status of Germany. This would require peace treaties with West Germany and East Germany, and an international agreement establishing West Berlin as a free city with its liberty guaranteed by the presence of token contingents of British, French, American, and Russian forces. The plan would mean that the Western powers would give *de facto* (though not necessarily diplomatic) recognition to East Germany. Both East Germany and West Germany would be involved in the agreements concerning the new status of West Berlin. West Berlin's access to the West would be assured.

What is wrong with this arrangement from the West's standpoint is that it really removes West Berlin from the pledged protection of the Western powers and leaves the city's two and a quarter million citizens exposed to gradual Communist subversion and control. Indeed, the

status quo to which West Berlin would be consigned in the Soviet plan means (by the accepted Communist interpretation of *status quo*) that the usual Communist techniques of take-over would be permitted to operate.

Moreover, the West has grave doubts about what the Soviets mean when they talk about "guaranteeing" the West's access to West Berlin. Words like "assure" and "guarantee" sometimes have different meanings in Communist jargon from those they have in the Western world.

Mr. Khrushchev's alternative solution is to sign a separate peace treaty of his own making with East Germany and to force the West to deal directly with the East German government in all matters related to West Berlin, including the sensitive issue of the corridors of access and communication with West Germany. This he has been threatening to do before the end of the year unless the West consents to his plan for resolving the Berlin and German questions, although he says now that he will not act until he has talked again with President Kennedy.

The West's view of Mr. Khrushchev's ultimatum was succinctly stated by President Kennedy in his report to the nation on July 25: "In Berlin . . . he intends to bring to an end, through a stroke of the pen, first, our legal rights to be in West Berlin and, secondly, our ability to make good on our commitment to the two million free people of that city."

The grave danger that hangs over the world is that if the East tries to force the Western powers out of Berlin or to isolate the city, and the West resists, the outcome could be war.

What are the views of West Germany and of West Berlin itself, on the subject of Berlin's future?

On July 12, West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and West Berlin's Mayor Willy Brandt issued a joint statement that emphasized the following points: (1) the right of the Western powers to remain in Berlin should be maintained; (2) interference with West Berlin communications with the West should not be permitted; (3) West Berlin's judicial, financial, and economic ties with West Germany should be regarded as a basic feature of the city's independent existence; (4) any agreement affecting Berlin should bear the approval of the people of the city; and (5) West Berlin should continue to be a meeting place of all Germans.



Mayor Brandt has proposed that the Berlin and German questions should be settled in a peace conference in which all of the fifty-two nations that fought against Nazi Ger-

many should participate. Chancellor Adenauer and his fellow leaders of the Christian Democratic Party of West Germany have sharply rejected the proposal. Adenauer, on the other hand, has declared that the people of Berlin (presumably both sectors of the divided city) should be permitted to decide by plebescite the conditions under which they want to live. This idea has no realism, of course, for the captive people of East Berlin.

A "THIRD" WAY

As we continue our analysis of the Berlin crisis, let us note some of the suggestions and forecasts that have been made by political leaders and commentators:

1. President Kennedy is chief among those who insist that the issue is not a choice between capitulation and nuclear destruction—for either the West or the East.

In his report to the nation in July, the President declared: "We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action. . . . The choice is not merely between resistance and retreat, between atomic holocaust and surrender. . . . We do not intend to abandon our duty to mankind to seek a peaceful solution."

The President went on to say: "If they have proposals, not demands, we shall hear them. If they seek genuine understanding, not concessions of our rights, we shall meet with them. We have previously indicated our readiness to remove any actual irritants in West Berlin, but the freedom of the city is not negotiable. . . . We are willing to consider any arrangement or treaty in Germany consistent with the maintenance of peace and freedom and with the legitimate interests of all nations."

This was said in July. In September, both Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy indicated their willingness to discuss the issues with each other, and to consider the possibility of negotiating their differences.

2. Senator Mike Mansfield, majority leader in the U.S. Senate, proposed on June 14 that East and West Berlin be unified in an internationally guaranteed "free city." He suggested that Berlin's neutrality should be guaranteed by both NATO and the Warsaw-Treaty Powers, and that Western access routes to the city should be garrisoned by "international peace teams." He said that "a third way" must be found between the Soviet and Western positions on Berlin. He was speaking for himself, he said, not for the Kennedy Administration.

3. Another proposal worth noting is that West Berlin be made an international city with guarantees of freedom and security that satisfy the West's commitments, and that some major units or organs of the United Nations be placed there. This idea has had considerable support in Britain and elsewhere.

4. The importance of the West's insistence that it has serious commitments to fulfill in relation to West Berlin's safety and independence cannot be overstated. There has been a great deal of talk about the West's "right" to be in West Berlin. This right exists only in relation to the responsibility of the West, under the London Protocol and subsequent agreements, to keep the city secure and free.

It should be noted that President

Kennedy, in all his statements in Berlin, has coupled "rights" with "commitments."

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Two events—the termination by the Soviet Union of a moratorium on atmospheric nuclear test explosions and the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjöld—have placed the issues of disarmament and the future of the United Nations alongside the Berlin question in the white focus of international concern and debate.

The disarmament and United Nations issues are not substantively related to the Berlin problem, but they are germane to it in that they broaden the basis for possible negotiation.

Some noteworthy developments as we approach press time for SOCIAL PROGRESS may be listed as follows:

1. There have been indications of a shift in the professed position of the United States on the question of German reunification. We have noted that this country has been consistently unwilling to concede, at least out loud, the permanent separation of Germany into two nations. It may be that this "position" was part of the basis for doing political business with Konrad Adenauer during the years of his power in West Germany, and that now, with Adenauer's role greatly reduced as a result of the elections of September 17, it is possible and practicable to be realistic by admitting that East Germany is going to be with us for the foreseeable future. Even Mr. Kennedy's speech to the UN General Assembly in September contained a short reference to Germany that has been regarded by some as a hint that the United States was getting ready to accept the *de facto* existence of the (East) German Democratic Republic.

2. One of the recent variations on Soviet proposals for the future of West Berlin is that it become an international city and that the United Nations be located there. This is in line with several other suggestions that major units of the United Nations be headquartered in West Berlin as a way of assuring the continued freedom and security of the city. There seems to be no wide support among United Nations delegates for the idea that the organization's principal headquarters should be moved to West Berlin. It is not impossible or even improbable, however, that a serious proposal to move a major United Nations agency to West Berlin, as part of an over-all solution to the Berlin question, would be strongly endorsed.

3. What do the Soviet leaders mean when they say that they would "guarantee" the West's routes of access and communication to West Berlin, but that the arrangements would have to be negotiated with the East German Government? This seems at the moment to be a sticky question, and the West insists on clarification in detail. Some of the West's doubts have been inspired by unruly utterances on the part of East German officials about what they will do with the access corridors when the Soviet Union signs a peace treaty and turns the controls over to them.

4. There is still a possibility that the German question will be put on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly, although there is

little enthusiasm for this move. It is generally felt that the issues of Berlin and Germany cannot be usefully discussed in a large body such as the United Nations, but should be negotiated and settled by the nations directly involved. It is true, however, that the United Nations General Assembly provides occasions for all member nations to speak their opinion on the Berlin and German issues, to make suggestions, and to urge the nations to whom the issues are immediately relevant to get down to the hard work of negotiating and finding solutions.

5. The United States has strongly declared its deadly serious view of the Berlin question and its determination to defend its rights and to fulfill its responsibilities in West Berlin. It appears, however, that other nations including, perhaps, the Soviet Union are not really convinced that the United States and the West will not back down and accept a highly compromised settlement. President Kennedy's address to the United Nations General Assembly helped greatly to clear away doubts about our firmness.

Let us point out again that the choice is not the practical certainty of war (if we insist on our "rights") over against the certainty of Communist expansion (if we give in on Berlin). The alternatives are not as extreme and gloomy as all that. The question is, rather—are we willing to accept some risk, even the risk of being forced to use force, in support of our obligation to defend the freedom and security of West Berlin, with the knowledge that if we abandon the city, we open the way to the certain westward expansion of Communism?

We believe that negotiation is possible and that a mutually acceptable solution can be found. But this can happen only if the East is convinced that the West means business and will accept whatever risks may be involved in its determination to stand by the people of West Berlin.

6. Right now Berlin is the trouble spot. Let us not forget that potentially dangerous situations exist in other areas, and that the next crisis may be in Iran, or in South Vietnam, or again in Laos, or in Paraguay. We can be sure of this—that even as we begin to see the signs of a break in the deadlock over Berlin and the end of danger there, trouble is brewing and crisis is in the making in some other part of the world.

The days ahead will require of us reasonableness, firmness, goodwill, and, most of all, a deep confidence in the power of God, working as he does through human instrumentalities, to shape and use the events of history for his own ends.

Adopted by the 173d General Assembly
Buffalo, New York, May, 1961

Recommendations Concerning
THE CHURCH'S WITNESS IN SOCIETY

That the General Assembly receive the following report in response to the reference made by the 172d General Assembly to the Board of Christian Education:

The 172d General Assembly took action to:

(a) "authorize the Board of Christian Education as it revises and strengthens the functions of the Department of Social Education and Action to confer with other agencies of the church as to the best means of enabling this office to render the greatest service to the whole church;

(b) "request the Board of Christian Education on the basis of such conference to recommend to the next General Assembly a redefinition of the function and representative character of the group presently known as the Committee on Social Education and Action of the Board;

(c) "recommend to synods, presbyteries, and sessions that Committees on Social Education and Action continue with their present names and functions pending the outcome of the above-mentioned studies and recommendations."

A. In reference to (a) above, the Board of Christian Education during the past year has restudied the organization and functions of the former Department of Social Education and Action and has conferred with the other agencies of the church, the Stated Clerk of the General Assembly, and the Secretary of the General Council as to the best means of enabling the Board's Office of Church and Society to render the greatest service to the whole church.

The functions of the Department of Social Education and Action are now carried by the Office of Church and Society and the General Division of Parish Education, as described below.

The Office of Church and Society is assigned responsibility for helping the church through its boards and agencies and its judicatories to speak and act with theological obedience and with pragmatic effectiveness with respect to the structures and forces of the secular order. This responsibility is to be discharged through a variety of functions such as:

1. To carry on a certain amount of social analysis and research in order to understand the constantly changing nature of our contemporary society, the forces affecting persons and families, the tension between church and society.

2. To experiment with methods of relating the church to the structures of society in order to affect them, to learn from them, and to change them.

3. To counsel with the agencies of our own church which are involved with the secular order, in order to learn from them, to share knowledge and experience with them, to co-operate with them in programs and projects that fall within the assigned concerns of the Office of Church and Society.

4. To counsel regularly with judicatory committees dealing with the concerns of church and society.

5. To share with the church information and insights about social issues, in the recommendations concerning the church's role in influencing the secular order.

6. To maintain useful relationships with cognate units in other churches, in the National Council of Churches, in the World Council of Churches, and in other ecumenical bodies, working with and through them wherever this is appropriate.

7. To establish relationships with selected "secular" agencies in society in order to learn from them, to influence them, and to co-operate with them when they work on goals and use methods consonant with our own.

8. To represent the church to the structures of society—speaking and acting for the church—whenever this is appropriate and cannot be done more effectively by some other agency of the church.

To the Division of Lay Education in the General Division of Parish Education has been assigned general responsibility for providing resources for the local congregation's social education and action emphasis and for the presbytery's (synod's) programs related to the local emphasis. Staff has been provided to fulfill this function. In helping the particular churches to recognize and respond to the ethical and social dimensions of the gospel, the staff assigned is related to the development of all educational resources prepared by the Board for use in particular churches and is responsible for preparation of any special social education resource deemed necessary for use in local churches.

B. With reference to (b) above, the Board of Christian Education proposes the following redefinition of the function and representative character of the group formerly known as the Committee on Social Education and Action of the Board.

The name of the Counseling Committee on Social Education and Action has been changed to the Committee on Church and Society.

The function of the committee is to be advisory to all of the boards, agencies, and judicatories of the church in implementing the actions of the General Assembly. It is the responsibility of the committee to prepare background materials for the General Assembly's Standing Committee on Social Education and Action (Church and Society) and to assist the Standing Committee in the preparation of policy declarations to be recommended to the General Assembly. The committee in its preparation of background materials will submit these materials to the Board of Christian Education for transmission to the Standing Committee with or without comments.

In order to enhance its representative character, it is *recommended* that the provision made by the 171st General Assembly for its composition (General Assembly *Minutes*, 1959, Part I, page 387) be amended to read as follows:

"27 members of whom six shall be appointed from the Board of Christian Education's membership, one of whom shall be designated as chairman by the Board of Christian Education; 3 from the membership of the Board of

National Missions upon nomination by that Board; 3 from the membership of the Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations upon nomination by the Commission; and 15 from the church at large, including at least 9 lay men and women nominated by the Committee on Nominations of the General Assembly. The members from the church at large shall be elected to terms of three years. The Board of National Missions and the Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations shall each name as ex-officio members without vote 3 staff members, one of whom shall be the General Secretary or his deputy, and the General Council shall name as ex-officio members without vote the Secretary of the Council or his deputy, and one other staff member."

C. With reference to (c) above, the Board makes the following report and recommendation:

Following the action of the 148th General Assembly in 1936 creating the Department of Social Education and Action in the Board of Christian Education, there have been repeated recommendations adopted by succeeding General Assemblies urging presbyteries and synods to constitute and maintain strong committees on social education and action in the respective judicatories.

At the present time such committees exist in most presbyteries and synods, although the practice varies in respect to committee relationships. In some judicatories the committee is a subcommittee of the Committee on Christian Education. In others it is a committee of the presbytery reporting directly to the presbytery.

In the past it has been stated that "the primary aim of the Social Education and Action Committee is to serve the churches," its chief function being "to encourage social concern and social witness in the churches." "The primary orientation should not be to the presbytery as an ecclesiastical body, but to the churches going about their business of 'making complete disciples' of all men within reach." It was suggested that the committee carry on its work through (1) establishing contacts in the churches, (2) providing program resources, (3) training local leaders, (4) counseling churches in handling controversial issues.

At the same time, the committee was supposed to have some relationship to the social witness of the presbytery. It was suggested that in acting upon urgent and often controversial issues the Social Education and Action Committee carried responsibility for (1) study of major social issues in community, national, and international affairs, (2) preparation of reports and recommendations for action on the floor of presbytery, (3) direct social action and the development of long-range social strategy for the presbytery and the churches.

The recommendation which is being presented to the General Assembly concerning the assignment of committee functions in presbyteries and synods is based on the assumption that the subordinate judicatories of the church exist to fulfill the following functions:

1. To provide an effective connectional relationship between judicatories and the national church implementing the concerns of the whole church, furnishing two-way communication between the national agencies of the church and particular churches and affording a means whereby the financial resources of all the churches may be brought to bear on the whole work of the church.

2. To supervise the particular congregations under the judicatories' care,

to encourage, to stimulate, and, if necessary, to discipline them in order that they may fulfill their corporate responsibilities.

3. As constituent corporate parts of the church, to bear witness within and to the corporate structures of society and to deal with issues confronting society with reference to which, because of the involvement of the welfare of people and because of ethical considerations, it is proper for the church to bear its witness.

In fulfilling these functions a judicatory should be concerned (1) to deal adequately with the church's corporate activities and relationships in the secular order and (2) to help the particular churches in the judicatory to recognize and respond to the ethical and social dimensions of the gospel. In recognition of these concerns it is *recommended:*

That the General Assembly request each presbytery (synod) to make provision through its standing rules (or other appropriate means) for the following assignment of function:

1. The General Council of the presbytery (synod) shall assume responsibility for policy recommendations having to do with the church's corporate witness in society on the judicatory level and for co-ordinating the judicatory's activities in this respect. It may establish a special committee on Church and Society of the General Council to study and make recommendations to the Council concerning the church's corporate activities and relationships in the secular order. (See Form of Government, Chapter XXIX, Section B.12.)

The Office of Church and Society of the Board of Christian Education will make available certain resources for the fulfillment of this responsibility.

2. The Committee on Christian Education of the presbytery (synod) shall be responsible for stimulating and assisting the churches in relation to the ethical and social dimensions of their life and witness. It may establish a Subcommittee on Social Education to fulfill this assignment.

The Division of Lay Education of the Board of Christian Education will make available certain resources for the fulfillment of this responsibility.

It is further *recommended* that the Standing Rules of the General Assembly be amended by changing the name of the General Assembly's Standing Committee on Social Education and Action to the Standing Committee on Church and Society, effective with the 174th General Assembly.

COMMENTARY

THE General Assembly in Buffalo approved these recommendations dealing with the assignment of presbytery responsibility for social education and action. The proposal originated in the Board of Christian Education after a number of consultations with synod and presbytery leaders and with other key persons.

The proposed plan would (1) assign to the General Council of the presbytery responsibility for policy recommendations dealing with the church's corporate witness in society and for co-ordinating the presbytery's activities in the social field and (2) assign to the Christian Education Committee continuing responsibility for encouraging and guiding the churches with respect to the social education aspects of their programs. In other words, and very generally speaking, the General Council is to be responsible for policy matters and the Christian Education Committee for local church program aspects of social education and action.

The Need for Something New

Presbyteries now take care of social education and action in two ways. In some presbyteries the function is assigned to a subcommittee of the Christian Education Committee of the judicatory. In other presbyteries a separate committee on social education and action is maintained with "working relationships" with the Christian Education Committee. In both these arrangements, the committees are responsible for policy recommendations on the judicatory level as well as for program development in the local churches.

A number of presbyteries have done outstanding work in connection with the church's response to social needs and issues. They have been courageous and skillful in writing pronouncements and in giving expression to the church's corporate witness in society. Some presbytery committees have done good work also in helping the churches to come alive in social education and action. In many presbyteries, however, social education and action committees have been only effective in guiding presbytery action and in stirring the churches moderately.

There was a time when it seemed appropriate and necessary to assign the responsibility of Christian social action to a special committee composed of persons who were known to be concerned about social problems or who could be trusted with this rather dangerous and suspected task. The United Presbyterian Church has come a long way in understanding its role in society and in relating social action to its total work. There is a need now for a reconsideration of the role of the presbytery in the social witness and of the distribution of committee responsibility for this important function.

Why the General Council?

The approval of Overture G by the General Assembly in Buffalo makes it possible for a presbytery to assign to its General Council responsibility

for initiating recommendations dealing with policy matters and for handling certain administrative functions. It would seem highly appropriate now for the presbytery to make the General Council responsible for initiating recommendations dealing with the presbytery's corporate witness and role in society, and for administering the implementation of these recommendations when they have been approved by the presbytery. In most cases, of course, the actual implementation would be done by some already constituted committee or agency of the judicatory, and the General Council's role would be that of assignment and coordination.

The "church and society" responsibility of the presbytery, assigned in the new proposal to the General Council, would include such functions as (1) community life, (2) the study of particular social issues and problems, (3) relations with "social action" programs and movements in the community, (4) approaches to secular groups and to centers of power and decision in the secular order, (5) advising the presbytery in making decisions and formulating policies and strategies with "social action" implications, (6) guiding the presbytery in its response to needs and issues in the social order, (7) developing activities related to the social witness of the judicatory.

Committee on Church and Society

In many presbyteries, perhaps in most of them, the General Council would choose to set up a Committee on Church and Society to take care of the new "church and society" function. The chairman of the committee would be a member of the General Council. The committee could include in its membership persons who have special interest and competence in such areas of Christian social concern as international affairs, economic life, civil rights, community development, political action. The committee would advise the General Council on "church and society" matters.

It is conceivable that some presbyteries would wish to have the Committee on Church and Society report directly to the judicatory in a manner similar to the way in which the Counseling Committee on Church and Society of the Board of Christian Education now reports directly to the General Assembly.

The Committee on Church and Society would be expected to have advisory relationship with committees and other units responsible for implementing presbytery policies with social implications, such as those dealing with community strategy, new church development, ministerial relations, interchurch and interfaith activities.

The Role of Presbytery Executive

The presbytery or synod executive, by virtue of his relationship to the General Council of the judicatory, would normally provide staff assistance and services in "church and society" matters. The Office of Church and Society of the Board of Christian Education would be expected to provide resources of various kinds, and to give every possible assistance to the judicatory executive, committee chairman, and others related to the "church and society" function of the presbytery.

Responsibility of the Christian Education Committee

In the proposed plan, responsibility for guiding and stimulating the particular churches in the program aspects of social education would be placed where it belongs—in the Christian Education Committee. The assumption here is that social education is an inescapable dimension of Christian education and the churches cannot avoid dealing with social issues and responsibilities.

Here, too, the Christian Education Committee may wish to constitute a subcommittee on social education similar in composition and responsibilities to other subcommittees dealing with age group programs and the like. The new plan requires that the Christian Education Committee include in its membership persons with genuine interest and competence in various social fields.

Role of Christian Education Field Director

The Christian Education field director of the synod or presbytery would, of course, be the responsible staff officer related to the social education function of the Christian Education Committee of the presbytery. His assignments in this area would not be any less under the new arrangement than they are under the prevailing system. There would still be need for social education and action "training events" (workshops, courses in leadership schools, institutes, and the like) oriented to the local churches and their leaders. The General Division of Parish Education of the Board of Christian Education would provide resources for Christian Education Committees to assist them in stimulating and guiding social education in the local churches of the judicatory.

Getting Started

The essence of the new proposal, we repeat, is that (1) the General Council assumes responsibility for "church and society" matters on the judicatory level, while (2) the Christian Education Committee continues to be concerned with "social education" in the churches of the presbytery.

It would take presbytery action, of course, to put the recommendation into effect—in most cases an appropriate revision of the rules ("by-laws") of the presbytery pertaining to the responsibilities of the General Council and of the Christian Education Committee.

In presbyteries where committees on social education and action are doing outstanding work, it would be the counsel of good sense not to tinker with the present arrangements any more than necessary. It would seem to be possible, in these cases, to change the "Committee on Social Education and Action" to a "Committee on Church and Society" related to the General Council of the presbytery, and to redefine the committee's function. At the same time, the Christian Education Committee would take over responsibility, through an appropriate subcommittee, for assisting the churches in the social education aspects of their programs.

Resources

In the new arrangement, the General Council of the presbytery (and

its Committee on Church and Society) would turn to the Office of Church and Society of the Board of Christian Education for counsel and assistance in "church and society" matters. The presbytery or synod executive would normally be the principal staff officer related to this function in the presbytery.

With respect to social education in the churches of the presbytery, the Christian Education Committee would look to the Christian Education field director and to the General Division of Parish Education of the Board of Christian Education for help in the form of program resources and staff services.

In short, the Office of Church and Society would "resource" the presbytery with regard to its corporate witness in society, working mostly with the General Council and with the presbytery and synod executives. The General Division of Parish Education would be concerned with social education in the churches of the presbytery, working through the Christian Education field director and the presbytery's Committee on Christian Education.

Synods Too

All that we have been saying about the assignment of presbytery responsibilities for corporate social witness and for social education applies also to the synods.

In the new proposal, the General Council of the synod becomes responsible for "church and society" matters, while the synod's Committee on Christian Education continues to serve the presbyteries and churches with respect to social education.

In most cases this would mean that the synod executive would be related to the "church and society" function, and that the Christian Education field director would be deeply involved in "social education" programs.

Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, has this to say of the United Nations role: "On a dark scene, in a dark time of troubles, New York's guest, the United Nations, is proclaiming by deed as well as word that men can live, not by violence and brute strength, but, at last, by reason and law. And I would say to the American people: support the United Nations with your approbation, your sympathetic attention, and your prayers."

All this is by way of introduction to World Order Sunday (October 22) and United Nations Day (October 24). A World Order Sunday Message has been approved by the General Board of the National Council of Churches and is available from the Department of International Affairs, National Council of Churches, 475 Fifth Avenue, New York 27, N.Y. (5 cents each; $4.00 a 100). The Message was prepared by the very excellent committee and staff of the Department of International Affairs of the National Council. Available also is a *Leaders' Guide for Individual and Community Action* related to United Nations Day. The 40-page pamphlet is distributed by the U.S. Committee for the UN, 375 Park Avenue, New York 22, N.Y. (1–5 copies, free; additional copies, 10 cents each).

About Books

The War Called Peace: Khrushchev's Communism, by Harry and Bonaro Overstreet. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1961. 368 pp. with index. $4.50.

This is an excellent book about the shape and substance of communism under Khrushchev.

A serious question for the West is whether communism today is somewhat different from the old brand and has in it a glimmer of hope for peace, or whether Mr. Khrushchev is a more shrewd and dangerous advocate of communism than we have had to deal with before and that communism really has not changed and shows no possibility of changing.

The Overstreets believe that there is something new in the Khrushchev brand of communist leadership, but a lot that is not new. They suggest that the new brand is still Bolshevik-Communism and that it is more subtly dangerous than ever before.

Some of the chapter headings suggest the range and scope of this important book: The Geography of Communism, The Meaning of "Peaceful Coexistence," History as a Weapon, Berlin: A Case Study, Exchange Programs: Whose Weapon?, The United Nations as Target, The Success Khrushchev Needs, Colonialism: Soviet Style.

Both the Overstreets are writers of repute. Each has appeared in print with important books. Harry Overstreet will be long remembered for *The Mature Mind.* In recent years they have successfully collaborated in several writing efforts. Their *What We Must Know About Communism* merited wide reading two or three years ago.

The present book is well written and faithfully documented. It is "anti-Communist" in intent, but it is by no means a "right wing" production. Both Harry and Bonaro Overstreet are liberal spirits.

The Promise of World Tensions, edited by Harlan Cleveland. The Macmillan Company, 1961. 157 pp. $3.50.

This excellent book is based upon background papers and reports of the Conference on World Tensions held in the University of Chicago in May, 1960. The Conference was attended by 150 persons—leaders in various fields of public and private endeavor, principally from the United States, with a sprinkling of delegates from Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Among the delegates and speakers were six "certified men of peace"—each of them a winner of the Nobel peace prize.

The Chicago Conference was the culmination of a series of meetings—a seminar on "Roadblocks to Peace," held in New York in 1957; the meeting of a "working party" at Bern,

Switzerland, in 1958; sessions of several committees working on background papers for the Chicago meeting itself.

The Bern conference of 1958 had suggested four goals of international co-operation: (1) a strengthened and enforceable body of world law; (2) social and economic well-being for all peoples; (3) an open world, with freedom of travel and communication; (4) a strengthened United Nations.

The Chicago Conference concentrated on (1) legal order, (2) economic development, (3) communications. The present book incorporates the working papers as well as the reports of the sections dealing with these three subjects. Included also are the texts of some of the outstanding speeches of the Conference —those by Ralph J. Bunche, Eugene Rabinowitch, Adlai E. Stevenson, Lester B. Pearson, Paul G. Hoffman, and the editor himself, Harlan Cleveland, who is now Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations.

The book concludes with an afterword by Mr. Cleveland in which he succinctly summarizes the thinking of the Chicago Conference as follows: (1) We cannot afford to be unimaginatively preoccupied with our relations with the Russians and the Chinese, at the expense of our relations with the rest of the world. (2) We need to build into our foreign policy a basic assumption of rapid political and social change in every foreign country—and in our own. (3) We need to build the kinds of strength, concentrated at the "point of sale" in each developing country, that can most directly be converted into governmental institutions staffed with people who know, or at least are trying to learn, how to govern. (4) We must cure ourselves of talking about international peace as if it were merely a goal or objective, rather than a long, difficult, intense, and never-ending task of building international and regional institutions for co-operative action.

Foreign Aid: Our Tragic Experiment, by Thomas S. Loeber. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1961. 139 pp. $3.50.

This is another angry book about American foreign aid. The author is angry because the high purposes of foreign aid have been too often frustrated by human stupidity and perversity and other human frailties.

As a result, our foreign aid has in some places turned into a powerful weapon against us.

All this Thomas Loeber regrets and resents with deep passion. He has written, however, not to degrade foreign aid but to plead for its improvement and better use.

This is a personal account, one man's observation, of some of the problems and frustrations that have plagued our program of economic and technical assistance in the newly developing countries of the world. He tells of scandals related to foreign aid administration, mostly on the part of the officials of the receiving governments, but not entirely. He reports superficial and completely meaningless investigations by representatives of Congressional committees controlling foreign aid programs and appropriations. In Jordan, for example, he

reports that official visitors from the United States "have come and gone," each, if he was important enough, with his interview with the king, each with his visit to the holy places of Bethlehem and Jerusalem, each with his good impressions, and each with absolutely no idea of what is really taking place in Jordan.

Mr. Loeber believes strongly that United States foreign aid should not be principally channeled, as some insist should be the case, through the United Nations. He declares that the United States should maintain control of the bulk of its foreign aid program because it presents an opportunity for a direct defense against the inroads of communism in the underdeveloped areas. This assumes, of course, that our foreign aid should be efficiently and intelligently administered.

The book concludes with a listing of nine recommendations which add up to a major reformation of our programs of foreign aid around the world.

Berlin—Pivot of German Destiny, translated and edited by Charles B. Robson. Introduction by Willy Brandt, Governing Mayor of Berlin. University of North Carolina Press, 1960. 233 pp. $5.00.

This book is based on a series of lectures delivered at the Otto Suhr Institute of the Free University of Berlin. The writers of the essays are prominent West Berlin educators and government officials. They are among the leaders of the new Berlin in the new Germany.

The authors speak as Berliners, and their partisanship is sincere and reasoned. What they have to say sheds some original light on the obligations of the Free World to the divided city, on the motives of the Soviet Union's Berlin policies, and on the possibilities of reconciling these opposing points of view.

The chapter headings include the following: The History of Berlin as Germany's Capital, The Splitting of Berlin in 1948, West Berlin: City and State, The Berlin Situation as a Sociopolitical Problem, The Economic Viability of Berlin, City Planning in Divided Berlin, The United States and the Berlin Problem: An American View.

The book was translated and edited by Dr. Charles B. Robson, Professor of Political Science in the University of North Carolina and formerly guest professor in the Free University of Berlin.

The Structure of the East German Economy, by Wolfgang F. Stolper with the assistance of Karl W. Roskamp. Harvard University Press, 1960. 478 pp. with index. $10.00.

This important study presents a unique comparison between a free and a communist economy. The models are the economies of the two German republics. This is a pioneering study, equal in importance to the first studies of the Russian economy. The book is bound to have a wide interest.

It is a scholarly and technical book and employs data available to the West for "measuring" and appraising the East German economy.

It begins with a discussion of population movements and the labor

force of East Germany and analyzes employment by economic sectors and industries.

There is another section on the East German methods of measuring gross product.

Then follow three sections dealing with various categories of industrial production, of agriculture and forestry, and of construction, transportation, and communication, and trade. The concluding short section has to do with the gross national product of East Germany.

In all the categories, East German data are analyzed in relation to comparable data concerning West German economic activities.

This is not a book for casual reading. The technical material will be of first importance to scholars in the field of communist economics, principally because of the valuable methods it uses for analyzing data from behind the Iron Curtain.

Dr. Stolper is Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan. At present he is on a leave of absence, serving as an economic adviser to the Nigerian Government. He is an active churchman and a member of the Counseling Committee on Church and Society of The United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.

The Coming Tests with Russia, by Walter Lippmann. Atlantic Monthly Press, 1961. 37 pp. $2.50.

This is a brief but extremely important book for those who seek to understand the realities and difficulties of the relation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The book is Walter Lippmann's firsthand account of his historic face-to-face interview with Nikita Khrushchev on April 10, 1961. It is an essential account of a timely and illuminating conversation.

Mr. Lippmann's first conversation with Mr. Khrushchev occurred in 1958 and consisted of a two-hour discussion. The 1961 encounter lasted for a full eight hours—with time out for a game of badminton.

In the April meeting with Mr. Lippmann, Mr. Khrushchev evidently opened his mind more freely and forcibly than he has to any other correspondent from the West. He spoke of disarmament, neutrality, the uncommitted nations, and his firm belief in the predestined acceptance of communism by the underdeveloped countries.

The most serious part of the talk in April was the discussion of the future of Germany, which the Soviet Premier regards as the central and the most sensitive issue between the East and the West.

This book can be read in less than half an hour, but it deserves several hours of serious pondering.

The Khrushchev Pattern, by Frank Gibney. Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc., 1960. 280 pp. with index. $4.95.

This book is a readable, lucid, and useful account of the methods of Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet Premier, in advancing the Communist cause around the world.

The author, a journalist of note, sees in the development of the "Khrushchev pattern" one of the most startling switches in the history of international politics, and, as he says, "one of the cleverest."

Mr. K.'s advocacy of "competitive coexistence" seemed on the surface and at first to challenge not only the Stalinist methods of the past but also the very premises of the Communist system. The book shows how successfully this new approach is operated with the Communist Parties and their sympathizers around the world. Mr. Gibney also examines the successes and failures of the world Communist movement in the light of Khrushchev's new approach.

Mr. Khrushchev has been forced to depart from his "soft sell" in dealing with such situations as the Hungarian Revolt in 1956 and U-2 incident of 1960.

The book adds up to a splendid account of Communist methods and successes, along with communist gains on the various ideological fronts—Latin America, Africa, China, Europe, Middle East.

There is a 64-page appendix in which Communist activities in sixty-seven countries are described.

The author has been reporting the Communist war on the world for the last sixteen years. He has served as an associate editor of *Time*, and a senior editor of *Newsweek*. In 1957 he joined the staff of *Life* as a special writer.

Storm Over Laos: A Contemporary History, by Sisouk Na Champassak. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. 202 pp. $5.00.

This book intends to be an objective appraisal of the events that have rocked Laos ever since it achieved independence, with particular focus on the period between the two Geneva conferences, 1954 and 1961.

The author is uniquely qualified to write about his own country. He is a native of Laos, but he has spent a good deal of his active political career in Europe and America, where he has gained a truly global perspective.

The book is not a justification of the policies of any one man or political party in the divided and confused Laos. It attempts, rather, to show the various stages of the advance of international communism in the area—on its road to the conquest of Southeast Asia.

At present the author is permanent representative of Laos to the United Nations, and as such is identified with the conservative groups which are solidly loyal to the West.

Making an Inter-American Mind, by Harry Bernstein. University of Florida Press, 1961. 190 pp. with index. $5.50.

This is a book by a scholar for scholars and for others who may be less than scholars but who still are interested in the long history of relations between intellectuals (scientists and scholars) of North America with their counterparts in Latin America.

The author devotes particular attention to the intellectual ties between the two parts of America in the Western Hemisphere from their earliest beginnings in Colonial times to the more recent ideological attainments which culminated in a development of inter-American studies as an integral part of the curriculums in some of the more important universities of North America.

The book is extremely well documented. Though it is a scholarly text, it presents a living picture of some of the early North American scientists who became interested in Latin America—Charles Hartt, for example, a brilliant young geologist connected with Cornell University, who became interested in Brazil, and in the midst of his pioneering efforts to study the area, died in 1878 at the age of thirty-eight.

The author is an expert on Latin American cultural relations and a professor of history at Brooklyn College. He has written at least two important books on inter-American relations.

The Attack on World Poverty, by Andrew Shonfield. Random House, Inc., 1960. 269 pp. with index. $5.00.

Part I of this very useful book discusses problems related to the economic development of underdeveloped countries. The author deals with such things as the limitations of economic aid, unfair shares, approach to economic independence, trade within the underdeveloped world, counting the cost.

The second part of the book deals with problems in the field of investment—the international ideal, the mirage of SUNFED, lessons from the World Bank, what the Bank cannot do, generosity frustrated, how to get more aid.

The third section analyzes the role of the United Nations.

The problem of world poverty, indeed, raises the most serious obstacles to world peace now confronting the great powers. The author, who is economics editor for the London *Observer*, has made a detailed survey of our present efforts at economic aid and shows where and how these efforts are inadequate.

The main argument of this controversial study is that we must not only provide more aid but apply it more effectively where it will yield the maximum return. The author argues that the Communists have a genuine advantage over us in this respect, simply because they can, through their government, deal more directly than we can through our quasi-official but generally autonomous agencies. If the West is to match the performance of the Russians, it will have to be prepared for some revolutionary departures from its current methods of producing and distributing foreign aid.

This book is well written and well documented. The text includes many illustrations (literary, i.e.) of the points Dr. Shonfield is making.

This is the kind of book we need —courageous enough to be critical of our African foreign aid, and yet favorable to the whole idea, and on the whole hopeful. This is a confident study of one of the most important issues facing the world today.

From The Department of State Bulletin, *Sept. 11, 1961.*

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